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3.1 Introduction
Advertising is a pervasive component of many product markets in the
United States, from soda to real estate to clothing. Until recently, the pro-
viders of health care in America had been conspicuously absent in this ac-
tivity. In fact, for a great deal of the last century, advertising by physicians
and hospitals was explicitly banned by their respective professional organ-
izations. In the American Medical Association’s (AMA’s) ﬁrst code of
ethics, it was written that “[advertising is] highly reprehensible in a regular
physician” (AMA 1848).
Although still relatively small compared with other industries,1advertis-
ing among hospitals has increased dramatically in recent years. Figure 3.1
shows average advertising expenditures among hospitals in the United
States from 1995 to 1998. Of the roughly 5,000 acute care hospitals in the
United States, 1,800 advertised in 1995. Among those hospitals, the aver-
age advertising budget was $79,000. By 1998, 2,500 hospitals advertised,
and the average spending among those hospitals had increased by 56 per-
cent in real dollars to $123,000 per hospital (Video Monitoring Services
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1. Hospital advertising is, on average, 0.1–2.0 percent of hospital revenues. Other industries
that are better known for their advertising have much larger advertising budgets. Soda com-
panies, for instance, spend 7–8 percent of revenues on advertising. Car companies spend a
little over 2 percent (CompuStat).
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Jason R. Barro and Michael Chu[VMS]). Over this same period, average hospital expenditures increased by
only 10 percent in real terms (American Hospital Association [AHA]
1995–98). Figure 3.2 illustrates the increase in participation in advertising
for hospitals over this time period. Less than 40 percent of hospitals ad-
vertised in 1995, compared with a little more than half by 1998.
Average advertising spending across all hospitals masks the most dra-
matic increase. Figure 3.3breaks out the hospitals into ﬁve categories: not-
for-proﬁt teaching hospitals, other not-for-proﬁt hospitals, for-proﬁt hos-
pitals, religious hospitals, and public hospitals. Figure 3.3 illustrates that
the true source of the overall advertising increase among U.S. hospitals has
been the not-for-proﬁt teaching hospitals. The spending levels in ﬁgure 3.3
are adjusted for bed size so that any diﬀerences in ad spending due to
diﬀerences in hospital size are removed. The average not-for-proﬁt teach-
ing hospital has increased its bed-adjusted ad expenditures by 140 percent.
For-proﬁt hospitals, however, have actually decreased their spending in
real terms over this time.
In this paper, we examine the underlying cause of this rapid increase in
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Fig. 3.1 Average hospital advertising spending, 1995–1998
Fig. 3.2 Percentage of hospitals that advertise, 1995–1998advertising among hospitals. We utilize a panel data set of hospital and
market characteristics along with a unique data set of hospital advertising
expenditures. In the end, a critical component of the explanation is the rise
of managed care across the country. Those hospitals—particularly the
large teaching hospitals—in markets that have experienced the greatest
rise in managed care inﬂuence had the most rapid increase in advertising.
The paper continues as follows. The next section discusses the history of
hospital advertising along with a discussion of the economics behind ad-
vertising for hospitals. The third section presents various hypotheses as to
why hospitals would have changed their advertising behavior at this time.
In the fourth section, we discuss the data. The ﬁfth section presents the em-
pirical results, and the ﬁnal section concludes.
3.2 The History and Economics of Hospital Advertising
One basic model of health care consumption in the United States in-
volves patients’ depending on their physicians as well-informed, benevo-
lent agents. When a patient needs to receive treatment in a hospital, the
physician suggests the course of treatment and the hospital in which it will
be done. Within this view of medical care, advertising directly to patients
can play very little positive role and may, in fact, be detrimental to patient
outcomes.
If the advertising signals lead the patient to disagree with the well-
informed, benevolent physician, then the patient may seek alternative treat-
ments. This may be positive if the physician was not fully informed or if the
physician was not truly acting in the patient’s best interest. But if the physi-
cian was truly acting in the patient’s best interest, then the patient will only
disagree with the physician’s choices when the advertising is false and the
patient is unable to determine its veracity. This appears to have been the ar-
gument behind the restriction of advertising by hospitals and physicians for
the bulk of the twentieth century.
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Fig. 3.3 Average advertising spending by hospital type, 1995–1998In 1847, when the AMA discussed advertising in its Code of Ethics, the
concerns focused on exaggerated or outright ﬁctitious claims perpetrated
by some supposed healers. Until the late 1970s, the AMA, as well as the
AHA, explicitly banned advertising for its members. A successful Federal
Trade Commission suit in 1980 made advertising a legal, if not accepted,
part of medical care. Prior to the ﬁnal decision, the AHA had already de-
cided to allow some regulated advertising for its member hospitals, as long
as the “truthful” advertising was not done at the “expense of the competi-
tor” (Rosenstein 1985, 34). Even now the AMA is careful to remind its
members that although there are no restrictions on advertising, there is
a concern that the public will be easily “deceived” and that information
transmitted to the public should be done in a “readily comprehensible
manner” (AMA 1848).
3.2.1 Not-for-Proﬁt Hospitals and Advertising
Prior to the recent upsurge in advertising, not-for-proﬁt hospitals his-
torically engaged in less advertising than their for-proﬁt counterparts. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows that, at the beginning of our sample in 1995, not-for-proﬁts
advertised less than for-proﬁts, adjusting for the size of the hospital. The
anecdotal evidence, and the fact that the AMA and the AHA had so long
banned the practice, suggests that not-for-proﬁts had never relied on ad-
vertising in the hospital industry. The nonreliance on advertising among
not-for-proﬁt hospitals has several possible explanations.
A situation in which not-for-proﬁts all choose to do little advertising re-
quires some degree of collusion among the market participants. Two facts
about not-for-proﬁt hospitals may help the hospitals collude not to adver-
tise: First, not-for-proﬁts are typically thought to have more complicated
objective functions than the typical proﬁt-maximizing for-proﬁt hospital,
and second, once a not-for-proﬁt generates proﬁts, it is restricted in how
those proﬁts are distributed. Both of these facts may make it easier to reach
a collusive agreement in which the hospitals are essentially agreeing not to
attempt to increase proﬁts.
There are many theories suggesting that the managers at not-for-proﬁts
may care less about proﬁts and are instead concerned with the provision of
public goods, such as charity care and research (Weisbrod 1988), or are
concerned with providing high-quality care (Hansmann 1980). According
to those theories, hospital managers may not advertise because the in-
creased proﬁts that the advertising brings are not the core concern of those
operating the organization. The nondistribution constraint also may cre-
ate less of an incentive for management to increase proﬁts, since there are
no oﬃcial owners to distribute the money.
Additionally, the managers at not-for-proﬁts may simply feel that adver-
tising, in its own right, is not an honorable activity. This is consistent with
the historical view of the AMA and the AHA. Hospital managers may like
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to provide, but some methods of achieving that proﬁtability are simply not
worth the moral cost.
Finally, not-for-proﬁt managers may enjoy spending their time on activ-
ities other than marketing and advertising. Without the pressure to do all
that is necessary to maximize proﬁts, perhaps the managers would simply
prefer to use their time to do other things—focus on medical services, re-
search, and so on. Regardless of which reason was the principle reason be-
hind the historically low level of advertising among hospitals prior to the
1990s, something has occurred to change the reality in the health care mar-
ketplace.
3.3 Theories of Advertising Changes
There are several possible explanations for the current rise in hospital
advertising. The ﬁrst possibility is the unraveling from one equilibrium, in
which few hospitals advertise, to another in which many hospitals adver-
tise. Perhaps all hospitals, particularly the large teaching hospitals, would
do little advertising as long as all of the other hospitals followed suit. Once
that equilibrium begins to unravel, it will unravel quickly; hence the rapid
increase in advertising.
Another hypothesis may be that the not-for-proﬁt hospitals have under-
gone a fundamental change in their objectives. One explanation as to why
hospitals have historically done so little advertising, as we indicated above,
is that marketing is unbecoming for a not-for-proﬁt institution—hence the
statement in the code of ethics. The corollary to that idea is that marketing
is a perfectly acceptable activity for an organization concerned with prof-
its. Perhaps advertising is increasing because for-proﬁt hospitals and their
ethics are becoming more dominant in today’s hospital market. This hy-
pothesis leads to two predictions. First, for-proﬁt hospitals should adver-
tise more than not-for-proﬁts, and second, advertising should increase
more rapidly for not-for-proﬁt hospitals that have more contact with for-
proﬁt competitors.
Another explanation is that hospitals and their executives are more will-
ing to engage in activities, such as advertising, that were once shunned be-
cause the new ﬁnancial realities in health care have made them necessary.
If the ﬁnancial strains become large enough, the choice for the hospital can
be to stay open and advertise, or not to advertise and either close or curtail
valued activities. The ﬁnancial situation for hospitals has gradually deteri-
orated through the 1980s and 1990s as reimbursements from government
and private payers have decreased. In addition to price reductions, hospi-
tals have experienced a steady decline in admissions and inpatient days.
This decline has been caused by technological improvements that have ren-
dered some inpatient procedures obsolete (e.g., cataract surgery) or have
The Rise of Hospital Advertising 105greatly reduced the length of stay for other procedures. In addition, hospi-
tals have faced pressures from managed care organizations to reduce
lengths of stay. The result has been that inpatient days in U.S. hospitals have
fallen by roughly 35 percent over the last twenty years (AHA 1995–98).
A ﬁnal hypothesis is that changes in the market structure and the man-
ner in which hospital reimbursements are determined have resulted in an
increased return to advertising. Perhaps the return to hospital advertising
had historically been very low, and the hospital executives chose not to ad-
vertise because they had little to gain. If the marketplace changes such that
there are signiﬁcant gains to be had by advertising, then hospital managers
will begin to advertise.
One major change in the health care market structure over the last twenty
years has been the rise of managed care. In 1998, health maintenance or-
ganizations (HMOs) provided health insurance to roughly 30 percent of
the U.S. marketplace (InterStudy 1998). Only four years earlier, that per-
centage was less than 20 percent, and twenty years ago, that percentage
was essentially zero. Health maintenance organizations reduce health care
costs, at least in part, by negotiating lower reimbursement rates with pro-
viders. They achieve leverage in those negotiations by only oﬀering a sub-
set of a market’s providers in their ultimate network. It is the threat to leave
a provider out of the network that provides HMOs with their power.
In a market with managed care organizations, advertising can poten-
tially provide leverage to the providers. The threat for managed care com-
panies to leave providers out of the networks is much more empty to the ex-
tent that providers can render themselves indispensable in the eyes of the
patients. In the extreme, if an insurer has very little chance of being able to
sell a product that lacks one key hospital, then that hospital has all of the
power in setting the reimbursement fees. Advertising directly to patients
may be a tool for the hospitals in creating this sense of necessity. The rise
of managed care has increased the returns to advertising to the extent that
advertising plays this new role in the negotiation process between hospitals
and managed care.
In the sections that follow, we test several of the hypotheses outlined
above. Given the large variation across hospitals and hospital markets, it is
possible to test each of the hypotheses empirically. The change in objective
function hypothesis can be tested using variation across markets in the in-
ﬂuence of for-proﬁt hospitals. In particular, those markets that have expe-
rienced the greatest increase in for-proﬁt inﬂuence should have the great-
est impact on the objectives of the other hospitals in the market.
C  O F H. Not-for-proﬁt hospitals
with more and increasing contact with for-proﬁt hospitals will advertise more.
The ﬁnancial distress hypothesis can be tested using variation in ﬁnan-
cial performance across hospitals and using diﬀerences in market structure
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ing the change in hospital advertising, then hospitals that experience more
ﬁnancial distress should advertise more. The alternative story is that hos-
pitals with less money will do less of everything, including advertising.
F D H. Hospitals in ﬁnancial distress will re-
spond by increasing advertising expenditures.
The penetration of HMOs into markets is a form of ﬁnancial distress for
hospitals. This means that the relationship between HMO penetration and
hospital advertising will combine two eﬀects: the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress
and the eﬀect of HMO presence on the returns to advertising. Empirically,
it is possible to disentangle these two eﬀects if the returns to advertising do
not change universally for all hospitals.
In the increasing returns to advertising hypothesis, advertising by hospi-
tals would focus on hospital quality in order to create the sense of necessity
among the patients. Some hospitals, particularly those that are large or are
teaching hospitals, may be more credible in their advertising than others.
Those hospitals for which their high-quality claims are more believable
should increase their ad spending more than those hospitals for which their
claims are less credible. The empirical test is then whether hospitals that
are more likely to be credible (i.e., teaching and large hospitals) increase
their advertising more in response to HMO penetration than do other hos-
pitals.
I R  A H. More credible hospi-
tals in markets with higher HMO penetration should respond with more ad-
vertising than other hospitals.
We will not focus directly on the initial hypothesis that the increase in
advertising is due to an equilibrium shift from no advertising to everyone
advertising. If none of the other hypotheses were to be supported in the
data, then the cascading equilibrium theory could be the explanation.
Even if the other hypotheses prove to have some validity, it is impossible to
prove that some form of equilibrium cascade did not occur. For instance,
in the data, it appears that large teaching hospitals responded to increased
HMO penetration by increasing ad spending. That provides support to
the increasing returns hypothesis, and it may also be true that once some
teaching hospitals decided to advertise, many others decided to follow.
More generally, it may be that any of the other hypotheses can act as trig-
gers in creating a cascade from one equilibrium to another. Additionally,
if not-for-proﬁt hospitals were not advertising before because their lack of
concern for proﬁts made collusion easier, then any change (in objective
function, ﬁnancial distress, or increased pressure from insurers) that
would increase their concern for proﬁts could lead to an equilibrium cas-
cade.
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The data we employ in this paper come from four sources: the AHA, the
Medicare Cost Reports, Interstudy, and VoiceTrak. Each source provides
a panel of data across U.S. hospitals from 1995 to 1998. The AHA data
contain information on hospital ownership, size, and location. The AHA
data are also used to generate data characterizing a hospital’s market, in-
cluding information on the number of competitors. The Medicare data
contain ﬁnancial information for the hospitals, including revenues, ex-
penses, and income numbers. The Interstudy data provide the information
on HMO penetration over time at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
level.
VoiceTrak is the source for the hospital advertising data (VMA): Voice-
Trak surveys roughly 11,000 media outlets each year, achieving a response
rate of over 85 percent by oﬀering the respondents some of the survey re-
sults. VoiceTrak surveys radio, print, and television outlets and compiles
an annual advertising spending number for each ﬁrm, including hospitals.
The VoiceTrak data were merged with the other data sources to create a
panel of roughly 5,000 hospitals over four years. Any advertising expendi-
tures attributed to hospital holding companies or hospital networks were
distributed among the member hospitals in the market, according to size
and to the amount possible. The network and aﬃliation data in the AHA
are far from complete. That should dampen the advertising numbers for
hospitals more likely to be in networks, to the extent that some expendi-
tures are not distributed.
3.5 Empirical Results
The ﬁrst hypothesis as to why hospital advertising has increased in re-
cent years is that the objectives of the hospitals have changed. In order to
test this, we ﬁrst examine whether hospitals of diﬀerent ownership types in
fact exhibit diﬀerent behavior with respect to marketing. If the diﬀerence
in advertising expenditures is caused by diﬀerences in objectives, then that
is presumably driven by not-for-proﬁts’ having an objective function that
diﬀers from proﬁt maximization. Most of the diﬀerences that would be
proposed, such as ethical concerns, should lead to not-for-proﬁts’ adver-
tising less than for-proﬁts. If the objectives of the hospitals are changing,
then not-for-proﬁts should behave more like for-proﬁts through time.
Table 3.1 presents results of a simple least-squares regression to illus-
trate the average advertising behavior by hospital types. The following re-
gression is estimated:
(1) AdSpendingh,t       t    1   Beds   ForProﬁth,t   Pubh,t
  TeachingHosph,t   εh,t
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Note: Dependent variable-real hospital advertising expenditures. T-statistics in parentheses;
boldface indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent conﬁdence level.where his “hospital” and tis “time.” The regression includes the VoiceTrak
advertising expenditures as the dependent variable. The number of hospi-
tal beds as well as dummy variables indicating hospital ownership type are
included on the right-hand side.
The results help illustrate that the general pattern is not entirely consis-
tent with the change in objectives hypothesis. If the hypothesis is correct,
for-proﬁts should advertise more than not-for-proﬁts, but the relationship
should narrow over this period of time while advertising spending is in-
creasing so rapidly. In the regressions, the omitted hospital category is non-
teaching, not-for-proﬁt hospitals. The regression in column (1) shows that,
over the whole time period, for-proﬁts do advertise more than nonteach-
ing, not-for-proﬁt hospitals and public hospitals, but less than teaching
hospitals. The diﬀerence between for-proﬁts and nonteaching not-for-
proﬁts is not signiﬁcant at standard levels of signiﬁcance.
The regression in column (2) presents results with each hospital type in-
teracted with the year eﬀects. These results highlight the regime shift in
hospital advertising that was evident in ﬁgure 3.3. By the end of the period,
for-proﬁt hospitals advertise signiﬁcantly lessthan all not-for-proﬁt hospi-
tals, and the teaching hospitals have increased their advertising expendi-
tures signiﬁcantly.
Again, this result is a little too strong for the change in objectives hy-
pothesis, since the not-for-proﬁts not only begin to advertise as much as the
for-proﬁts, but even surpass them. It is possible that a change in objectives
could still be a driver behind the rise in advertising if it were true that the
returns to advertising are higher for the not-for-proﬁts and the teaching
hospitals, in particular. Then, once all hospitals are comfortable advertis-
ing, the not-for-proﬁts would actually do more, not just the same amount.
Another test of the change in objectives hypothesis is to see whether hos-
pitals that interact more with for-proﬁt hospitals advertise more. The as-
sumption behind this theory is that not-for-proﬁt hospitals have histori-
cally had an ethic of not advertising, while for-proﬁt hospitals have not felt
restricted with respect to marketing. As not-for-proﬁt hospitals increas-
ingly interact with for-proﬁts, they may begin to absorb some of their be-
haviors. In table 3.2, the following ﬁxed-eﬀects regression is estimated:
(2) AdSpendingh,t    h    t    1   ForProﬁtMktShareh,t    2Xh,t   εh,t
Again, the advertising expenditures are the dependent variable. Year
and hospital ﬁxed eﬀects are included on the right-hand side along with
other hospital and market characteristics including; ownership status (for-
proﬁt, public, or religious), teaching status, hospital occupancy rate, net
income, and whether the hospital is a local monopoly (i.e., no other hospi-
tal within ten miles). The key variable of interest is the percentage of hos-
pital beds in the hospital’s ten-mile market that are in for-proﬁt hospitals—
the for-proﬁt market share. This variable, as well as interactions of this










Hospital beds 77.72 78.11
(0.75) (0.75)
For-proﬁt market share in ten-mile market 86,845.62 78,777.74
(1.88) (1.75)
Interactions
For-proﬁt market share • For-Proﬁt –101,889.95 –94,168.86
–(1.58) –(1.50)
For-proﬁt market share • Public –62,834.33 –62,119.12
–(1.11) –(1.10)
For-proﬁt market share • Religious –72,150.87 28,076.80
–(0.69) (0.85)
For-proﬁt market share • Teach –70,884.33
–(0.67)
Monopoly in ten-mile market 5,988.82 6,699.86
(0.41) (0.46)
Occupancy rate –7,985.25 –7,995.76
–(0.65) –0.65











Hospital ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
N 15,791 15,791
R2 0.78 0.78
Notes:Dependent variable-real hospital advertising expenditures. T-statistics in parentheses.
Boldface indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent conﬁdence level. Standard errors are het-
eroscedasticity robust and clustered by hospital.variable with the various ownership types, are included in the regression.
The hypothesis is that as a hospital is increasingly interacting with for-
proﬁt hospitals, the more likely that hospital is to begin behaving as a 
for-proﬁt.
The results are presented in table 3.2. The only diﬀerence between
columns (1) and (2) is that teaching status is not included in the ﬁrst re-
gression. The coeﬃcient on for-proﬁt market share (86,845) represents the
impact of increased for-proﬁt market share on the omitted category—non-
teaching, not-for-proﬁt hospitals. This coeﬃcient is marginally signiﬁcant
and positive, but the magnitude is small relative to the overall change in ad-
vertising. The result suggests that an increase in for-proﬁt market share of
10 percent leads to an increase in advertising of $8,600. The average change
across hospitals in for-proﬁt market share from 1994 to 1998 is less than 1
percent. The standard deviation is 15 percent, so there were some hospitals
that experienced a signiﬁcant increase in for-proﬁt inﬂuence. The eﬀect for
teaching hospitals is essentially zero. Since the largest increase in hospital
advertising over this time period has been from large teaching hospitals, the
impact of for-proﬁt hospitals does little to explain the general trend.
The coeﬃcients on net income and occupancy rate are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. This is the ﬁrst test of the ﬁnancial distress hypothesis.
The regressions in table 3.2 provide no evidence that tougher ﬁnancial con-
ditions lead to an increase in advertising.
Table 3.3presents results on the relationship between HMO penetration
and hospital advertising. These results provide insight into both the ﬁnan-
cial distress hypothesis and the change in returns to advertising hypothe-
sis. At one level, an increase in HMO penetration is a negative ﬁnancial
shock to hospitals. This may aﬀect advertising in either direction. The ﬁ-
nancial distress hypothesis suggests that the rise in advertising may be due
to increasing ﬁnancial strain on hospitals. Alternatively, a strain on hospi-
tal budgets may require a decrease in all types of spending, including ad-
vertising. At another level, the presence of HMOs in the market may in-
crease the returns to advertising. This aﬀect may diﬀer across hospitals, as
some hospitals may have more credibility in their claims of high quality.
The regressions in table 3.3 estimate the following regression:
(3) AdSpendh,t    h    t    1   ForProﬁth,t    2   TeachingHosph,t
   3Lh,t    4   TeachingHosph,t   Lh,t    5   HMOMSA,t
  εh,t
where Lequals more than 200 beds. As with equation (2), the regression in-
cludes hospital and year ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as controls for hospital type
and the HMO penetration at the MSA level. The regression in column (2)
contains interaction terms between HMO penetration and the for-proﬁt,
teaching, large, and large-teaching variables.
The coeﬃcient on the HMO penetration variable is the result of interest.
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ship between HMO penetration and hospital advertising. The coeﬃcient is
positive, but not signiﬁcant at normal levels. Once the interactions are in-
cluded, an interesting pattern is revealed. The omitted group—nonteach-
ing, not-for-proﬁt hospitals—responds to increased HMO penetration by
advertising less. Every 10 percent increase in HMO penetration leads to
$8,800 less in advertising. For-proﬁt hospitals also respond to increased
HMO penetration by advertising less, not more (as either the ﬁnancial dis-
tress or the increased returns hypotheses would suggest). Increased ﬁnan-
cial distress appears to lead to less spending on advertising for small and
for-proﬁt hospitals.
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Table 3.3 Advertising and HMO Penetration
(1) (2)
Hospital beds 129.97 145.43
(1.21) (1.38)







Hospital beds   200 104,938.15
(1.75)

















Hospital ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
N 10,387 10,387
R2 0.76 0.77
Notes:Dependent variable-real hospital advertising expenditures. T-statistics in parentheses.
Boldface indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent conﬁdence level. Standard errors are het-
eroscedasticity robust and clustered by hospital.The ﬁnal groups—teaching and large hospitals—provide evidence con-
sistent with the increased returns to advertising theory. Both teaching hos-
pitals and large hospitals respond to increased HMO penetration with
additional advertising. The eﬀect for a large, nonteaching hospital is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, although the eﬀect is no longer negative
as with the previous groups. For large teaching hospitals, the eﬀect of
HMO penetration on advertising is signiﬁcant and large. Each 10 percent
increase in HMO penetration leads to a $43,000 increase in hospital ad-
vertising. Among large teaching hospitals, the average change in HMO
penetration from 1995 to 1998 was 8 percent, with a standard deviation of
14 percent. On average, this category of hospitals increased its advertising
spending by $150,000. The increased inﬂuence of managed care appears to
explain a signiﬁcant percentage of that change.
3.6 Conclusions
The rise of hospital advertising in the late 1990s is best characterized by
the signiﬁcant increase in marketing activity by large, not-for-proﬁt teach-
ing hospitals. There is little evidence to suggest that any increased inﬂuence
of for-proﬁt hospitals explains the recent pattern in marketing behavior.
Over this time period, for-proﬁt hospitals have actually decreased their
marketing expenditures. Nonteaching, not-for-proﬁt hospitals that were
exposed to more for-proﬁt competition increased their ad expenditures in
a marginally signiﬁcant manner, but the magnitude of the eﬀect is small.
Changes in managed care penetration are positively correlated with in-
creased advertising, but only for the teaching hospitals (particularly for
large teaching hospitals). For all other hospitals, increased managed care
reduces ad spending, suggesting that HMOs represent a ﬁnancial shock
to hospitals. For the large teaching hospitals, the results, with respect to
HMOs, suggest support for the increased return to advertising hypothesis.
The presence of HMOs in the marketplace introduces a new negotiating
dynamic, in which hospitals can attain higher reimbursement fees if they
can dampen the HMOs’ ability to threaten to leave them out of insurance
contracts. Advertising directly to patients, if eﬀective, can perhaps help to
create a sense of necessity for a hospital. Only hospitals with credible high-
quality claims (i.e., large teaching hospitals) will gain through this type of
advertising. For all the other hospitals, HMOs are simply a ﬁnancial
shock, and, consequently, advertising expenditures should fall.
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